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1 This review article was written while the author was a research scholar at the Center 
for Health and Wellbeing, Princeton University.  The very useful comments of Anthony 
Garnaut, John S. Lyons, Nancy Qian, and Stephen Wheatcroft on an earlier draft are 
gratefully acknowledged.  
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GREAT LEAP INTO FAMINE 
 
 Frank  Dikötter’s  Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most 
Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-62 is the longest and most detailed study of the 
Great Leap Forward (GLF) famine to appear in English to date.  Much of the 
story will be already familiar to western readers from works by Roderick 
McFarquhar (1983), Jasper Becker (1996), Ralph Thaxton (2008), and others, 
but Dikötter adds a lot that is new and valuable.  For the past decade or so 
Chinese scholars have been publishing works based on public records, including 
party archives, formerly closed to historians.  Most prominent of these are Yu 
Xiguang, Cao Shuji, and Yang Jisheng.  Yang’s Tombstone created a sensation 
when it appeared in Hong Kong in 2008, and its English translation is eagerly 
awaited (see Yang 2010).  Dikötter, a prolific writer, has been quickest off the 
mark among western scholars in accessing these records, and Mao's Great 
Famine [henceforth MGF] is informed by an ‘against the grain’ reading on ‘well 
over a thousand’ documents from cities and provinces spread across China 
(although excluding Anhui and Henan, two of the worst-hit provinces).  
Harrowing images of brutality and suffering based on these documents (rarely, 
however, quoted directly) give a vivid and graphic character to MGF, although 
whether the end result fundamentally ‘transforms’ our understanding of the 
GLF and accompanying famine is moot.  
Dikötter begins with a broadly chronological narrative of the Great Leap 
Forward and accompanying famine (Chapters 1-16).  The remainder of the book  
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describes the impact on the economy and the environment (Chapters 17-21), 
and the cost in terms of lives ruined and lost (Chapters 22-37).  It begins in 
1953 with the death of Stalin, which Chairman Mao Zedong saw as an 
opportunity for asserting his independence of Moscow, and ends in 1962 when 
Mao was confronted by his own Khrushchev in the person of Liu Shaoqi.  The 
tone throughout is one of abhorrence and outrage, and sometimes MGF reads 
more like a catalogue of anecdotes about atrocities than a sustained analytic 
argument.  In style and approach it recalls Jung Chang and Jon Halliday’s 
controversial Mao: The Unknown Story (2005); indeed, Chang leads the ‘praise’ 
for MGF on the back-cover. 
MGF may become the best-known account of the GLF famine for a while.  
But should it?  It is not a comprehensive account of the famine; it is dismissive 
of academic work on the topic; it is weak on context and unreliable with data; 
and it fails to note that many of the horrors it describes were recurrent 
features of Chinese history during the previous century or so.  More attention 
to economic history and geography and to the comparative history of famines 
would have made for a much more useful book.  In what follows I focus on the 
economic context of the famine, review features of the famine treated by 
Dikötter but worth further study, and conclude by discussing the role in these 







  Famines are a hallmark of economic backwardness.  It bears 
remembering that China on the eve of the Great Leap Forward was one of the 
poorest places on earth, if not the poorest.  According to the late Angus 
Maddison’s reconstructions, Chinese real GDP per head in 1957 was only one-
quarter of the global average in the 1950s and one-twelfth of today’s global 
average.  Despite having been (by Maddison’s reckoning) the 12
th fastest-
growing economy on the globe since 1950, China in 1957 was still ranked 120
th 
out of the 140 economies included.  Alternatively, only ten of the same 140 
economies were poorer in 1970 (and only eight in 1980) than China had been on 
the eve of the Great Leap Forward.  The Penn World Tables (Heston et al. 
2009) paint much gloomier picture of the Chinese economy in this period.  
Their coverage is much narrower for the 1950s, and their earliest data for 
China refer to 1952.  In each year between 1952 and 1957, the Penn World 
Tables reveal China’s GDP per head as the lowest in the world (Table 1).  They 
imply that Chinese GDP per head in 1957 was 3.9 per cent that of the USA; by 
Maddison’s reckoning the ratio was 5.8 per cent.  Low GDP per head was 
compounded by very unequal land and income distributions (Brandt and Sands 
1992: Table 6.3), low life expectancy, and high infant mortality. 
  China’s extreme poverty was also reflected in its recent famine history. 
For at least a century before 1949, major famines were probably frequent 
enough to warrant Walter Mallory’s depiction of China in 1926 as the ‘land of 
famine’.  The Taiping Rebellion is routinely reported as costing twenty million  
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lives, mostly from famine and disease.  Neither R. H. Tawney’s report that the 
famine of 1849 ‘is said to have destroyed 13,750,000 persons’ nor 
contemporary claims that the Great North China Famine of 1876–9 took a 
further 9.5 million to 13 million should be taken literally, but such estimates 
accurately underline the apocalyptic nature of those famines.  Famine 
mortality probably declined thereafter.  Yet Yang (2010) claims that China’s 
most severe famine before the GLF famine occurred in 1928-30, killing ten 
million people.  Between 1920 and 1936, he added, ‘famine due to crop 
failures took the lives of 18.36 million people’.  Again, these numbers seem too 
high.  Still, Tawney witnessed the devastation that followed in the wake of the 
famines of the late 1920s, and famine in Anhui province in 1929 inspired Nobel 
laureate Pearl Buck’s The Good Earth.  Nor did it end there.  Famine in the 
Yellow River region in 1935 resulted in significant female infanticide in 1935–6, 
while the Henan famine of 1942 produced its own catalogue of atrocities.  
Again and again, what Dikötter dubs ‘traditional coping mechanisms’ (p.179) 
had failed to prevent famine. 
  It also bears noting that the impact of the famine was greatest in 
China’s poorest regions, and in those regions where harvest shortfalls were 
greatest in 1959-61.  Proxies for the harvest and regional income alone explain 
about half the variation in excess mortality during the GLF (Ó Gráda 2008).
2  
Had Dikötter focused more on the implications of northern China’s ‘dry and 
                                                 




dusty countryside [and] an alkaline soil that hardly yielded enough grain for 
villagers to survive on’ (p. 46) he might have produced a more rounded account 
of the tragedy.  This, it hardly bears stressing, is not to deny the role of human 
agency, however, since the harvest shortfall, if not the poverty, was 
endogenous to policy (see below). 
  China’s extreme backwardness on the eve of the Leap matters because 
it greatly increased its vulnerability to disequilibria, man-made or other.  Had 
Chinese GDP per head been, say, twice as high as it was, the devastation 
wreaked by the Leap would presumably have been much less.  Nor, on the 
other hand, does MGF take sufficient account of how conditions improved 
between 1949 and 1958.  If the standard estimate of grain output of 200 million 
metric tons in 1958 is taken at face value (p. 132), then there was enough food 
to provide an average daily intake of about 2,170 kcals (Ashton et al. 1984: 
622; compare Meng et al. 2010).  If, however, the output data are 
contaminated by Leap-style ‘winds of exaggeration’ and refer to unhusked 
grain, then the picture is much less rosy, and the margin for error by central 
planners much narrower.  Nonetheless, the achievements of the pre-Leap years 
prompted a false optimism that much faster growth was feasible—catching up 





TABLE 1. CHINESE GDP PER HEAD IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 

































































N  60 62 65 69 69 69 
Source: Heston et al. (2009). 
Note: the Chinese estimates are averages of the two estimates given each year.  
N is the number of economies included in the database in any year. The 




WHAT DID THE VICTIMS DIE OF? 
  Throughout history most famine victims have succumbed to disease, not 
to literal starvation.  Weakened immune systems and social disruption allowed 
diseases present in normal times to play havoc during famines.  Pre-1949 China 
was no exception: economic backwardness made infectious diseases such as 
cholera, typhus, and malaria endemic and most famine deaths were from such 
diseases and from dysentery. So what did the victims of the Great Leap famine  
7 
 
die of?  Most accounts imply death by starvation rather than by disease; 
Thaxton links most deaths in the village of Da Fo in 1960 to ‘edema’, and this is 
corroborated by the most detailed study of the causes of death to date, Yixin 
Chen’s analysis of public health gazetteers from Anhui province (Thaxton, 
2008: 209, 253; Chen 2010).  Although Chen argues convincingly that the faulty 
data in the gazetteers underestimate the death toll from diseases such as 
dysentery and malaria, he nevertheless concedes the primary role of oedema 
and literal starvation.  Dikötter (p.286) concurs, and wonders why disease did 
not carry off more ‘before terminal starvation set in’. 
The primacy of starvation as the cause of famine deaths is rather 
striking, and poses a conundrum for famine demographers.  Before the 1950s 
only war-famines in economies with effective public health regimes, such as 
the western Netherlands in 1944-45 or Leningrad in 1941-43, followed such a 
pattern.  Does this imply that the Maoist public health campaigns of the early 
and mid-1950s influenced the causes of deaths during the Great Leap famine, if 
not the death toll itself?  Could it be that the authorities’ attempts to control 
migration limited, even albeit unintentionally, the spread of infectious 
diseases?  Chen (2010) gives due credit to achievements registered before the 
Leap; by then three major killers—smallpox, plague, and cholera—had been 
virtually eliminated, and large-scale immunization campaigns carried out.  
Reluctant to allow public health improvements a role, Dikötter surmises, albeit 
without supporting evidence, that the Chinese peasantry succumbed to  
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starvation quickly, ‘reducing the window of opportunity during which germs 
could prey on a lowered immunity’ (p.286). 
 
 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT 
MGF is full of numbers but there are few tables and no graphs.  
Quantification is not its strong point.  So we read that ‘between one and two 
million took their lives by suicide’ during the GLF (p. 304); that in Xinyang in 
Henan province ‘67,000’ were clubbed to death by militias (pp. 117, 294); that 
in some unspecified location ‘forty-five women were sold to a mere six villages 
in less than half a year’ (p. 261); that ‘at least 2.5 million … were beaten or 
tortured to death’ during the Leap (p. 298); and that delays to shipping in the 
main ports during some unspecified period cost ‘£300,000’ (p. 156).  An 
estimate of 0.7 million deaths from starvation and disease in labor-correction 
camps between 1958 and 1962 is obtained by applying an arbitrary ‘rough 
death rate’ of two-fifths to a guess at the camp population at its peak (p. 289).  
The main basis for the claim that ‘up to two-fifths of the housing stock turned 
into rubble’ (p. xi) seems to be a report describing conditions in Hunan 
province from Liu Shaoqi to Mao on 11 May 1959, after Liu had spent a month in 
the region of his birth (p. 169).
3  On page after page of MGF, numbers on topics 
                                                 
3 Elsewhere, however, Liu is described as visiting his home region for the first time in 




ranging from rats killed in Shanghai to illegal immigration to Hong Kong are 
produced with no discussion of their reliability or provenance: all that seems to 
matter is that they are ‘big’. 
The cost of famines in terms of lives lost is often controversial, because 
famines are nearly always blamed on somebody, and excess mortality is 
reckoned to be a measure of guilt.  It is hardly surprising, then, that MGF’s 
brief account (pp. 324-34) of the famine’s death toll arrives at a figure far 
beyond the range of between 18 million and 32.5 million proposed hitherto by 
specialist demographers (e. g. Yao 1999; Peng 1987; Ashton et al. 1984; Cao 
2005).  Rather than engage with the competing assumptions behind these 
numbers, Dikötter selects Cao Shuji’s estimate of 32.5 million and then adds 
fifty per cent to it on the basis of discrepancies between archival reports and 
gazetteer data, thereby generating a minimum total of 45 million excess 
deaths.   
Much hinges on what ‘normal’ mortality rates are assumed, since the 
archives do not distinguish between normal and crisis mortality.  The crude 
death rate in China in the wake of the revolution was probably about 25 per 
thousand.  It is highly unlikely that the Communists could have reduced it 
within less than a decade to the implausibly low 10 per thousand adopted here 
(p. 331).  Had they done so, they would have ‘saved’ over thirty million lives in 
the interim!  One can hardly have it both ways. 
  Famines invariably also result in fewer births.  Sometimes the births are 
lost, sometimes (as to some extent in China in 1959-61) they are postponed.   
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Surprisingly, perhaps, Dikötter has little to say on this aspect, but his attempts 
at quantification again lack conviction.  Elementary human biology means that 
the drop in the number of births in one region of Yunnan province from 106,000 
in 1957 to 59,000 in 1958, which Dikötter mentions twice (pp. 68, 254), refers 
mainly to conditions before the Leap.  And his implied claim (pp. 260-61) that 
marriage rates rose during the famine would, if verified, represent a first in 
the global history of famine.
4 
  Another feature of the famine’s demography touched on only in passing 
is its disproportionately rural dimension.  Data collected from Anhui gazetteers 
by Cao Shuji (2005: Appendix 3), although probably subject to under-recording, 
are highly revealing on this aspect.  Anhui’s proportionate population loss was 
the highest in China, but whereas the death rate in urban areas rose by 260 per 
cent, in rural areas it rose almost eightfold. Note too the very different rates 
of population change in rural and urban Anhui and the dramatic rebound in 
births in both rural and urban areas in the wake of the famine. 
 
                                                 
4 The number of marriages in the 1982 Chinese fertility survey sample fell from 3,998 
in 1958 to 3,393 in 1959, and then rose to 4,219 in 1960 (China Population Information 


































































Figure 1. Population Change in Anhui 1954-1965 
 
Finally, as Dikötter highlights, not all Leap deaths were famine deaths. 
His anecdotal evidence on the terror campaigns waged by local cadres is 
compelling, although his figures for deaths in the ‘gulag’ (‘at least 3 million’), 
by suicide (‘between 1 and 3 million’), and from torture and beatings (‘at least 
2.5 million’) are just weakly-supported guesses (pp. 291, 298, 304).    
 
 
HORRORS OF FAMINE: 
  Anthropologist Kirsten Hastrup (1973: 730) has argued that when a 
famine results in cannibalism it has gone ‘far beyond mensurational reach’ to a 
level of ‘hardship so extreme that humanity itself seems at stake’.  Dikötter’s   
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account of cannibalism during the 1959-61 famine (pp. 302-23) helps to 
underline its apocalyptic character, but famines resulting in cannibalism were 
much more common in the past that either he or Hastrup imply. While never 
responsible for more than a minuscule fraction of famine deaths, the evidence 
for famine cannibalism recurs throughout history (Ó Gráda 2009: 63-68), not 
least in late Qing and Republican China.  Three stock phrases regarding 
cannibalism recur in gazetteers’ accounts of the ‘Incredible’ North China 
famine of 1876-78: ‘people ate each other’, ‘exchanging children and eating 
them’, and variants of ‘people ate each other to the point that close kin 
destroyed each other’ (Edgerton-Tarpley 2008: 223).  Theodore White’s reports 
from Henan in 1942–3 described parents tying children to a tree ‘so they would 
not follow them as they went in search for food’; ‘larger’ children being sold 
for less than ten dollars; and a mother who was charged with eating her little 
girl merely denying that she had killed her. Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley (2008: 
225) surmises that such accounts were ‘primarily metaphorical expressions of 
the catastrophic destruction of the family unit wrought by the famine’; alas, 
the evidence presented by White, Becker, Yang Jisheng, and now Dikötter 
argues otherwise. 
      
THREE PARTS NATURE? 
The role of the weather in 1959-61 remains contested.  Is Dikötter right 
to dismiss it?  Contemporary Chinese sources highlighted ad nauseam the 
difficulties caused by drought and flooding, while denying the existence of  
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famine conditions.  Western journalists and historians echoed this view.  Time 
Magazine repeatedly reported adverse weather
5, and an eminent Harvard 
sinologist declared as late as 1969 that conditions such as those experienced in 
1959-61 ‘would have meant many millions of deaths in the areas most severely 
affected’ but for the effectiveness of public policy and the transport network 
(Perkins 1969: 303).  MacFarquhar’s pioneering account of the famine also 
highlighted adverse weather a factor (MacFarquhar: 1983: 322). 
Dikötter acknowledges the challenges posed by the weather but blames 
harvest shortfalls instead on the environmental destruction caused by the GLF, 
which magnified damage caused by adverse weather shocks.  Perhaps, but here 
anecdotes are an inadequate substitute for more rigorous meteorological 
analysis.  Research on the impact of the weather hitherto has relied on indirect 
measures such as the proportion of the grain crop damaged by the weather or 
reported grain production.  Using this approach Y. Y. Kueh found that droughts 
and flooding accounted for the bulk of the shortfalls in 1960 and 1961, although 
he also insisted ‘even without natural disasters, the agricultural depression was 
inevitable’ (Kueh 1984: 80-81, 1995: 224). Researchers have only begun to use 
some abundantly available direct measures that are not subject to mis-
reporting.
6  In the absence of systematic analysis of these data, all one can say 
is that several weather stations show signs of exceptional adverse weather 
                                                 
5 E.g. July 6 1959; August 24 1959; August 22 1960; January 6 1961; April 21 1961; May 
26 1961. 
6 E.g. Garnaut (2009); Meng et al. (2010)  
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shocks in 1959-61, though hardly enough to account for the regional variation 
in harvest shortfalls.
7  Dikötter’s sense that the weather did not matter much 
may well be correct, but his failure to nail the issue is a lacuna.  
 
HUMAN AGENCY 
Malthus and his followers underestimated the role of human factors in 
exacerbating and mitigating famine in the past, even in very backward 
economies.  As John Post pointed out in his classic account of famine in 
northwestern Europe in the 1740s, ‘even very poor economies … could escape 
famine conditions and crisis mortality by importing grain supplies, adequate 
welfare programs, and effective public administration’ (Post 1984: 17).  This 
message is also an important implication of Amartya Sen’s entitlements 
approach to famine analysis (Sen 1981).  Malthusian interpretations of famine 
in China begin with Malthus himself, and most analyses of pre-1949 Chinese 
famines continue to be strictly Malthusian.  Consider the following from 
Thaxton (2008: 26): 
                                                 
7 Chinese weather station data are conveniently summarized at 
http://www.famine.unimelb.edu.au/weather_stations.php.  Weather stations 
reporting exceptionally adverse weather conditions in this period include Chengdu, 
Sichuan (four wet summers in succession in 1958-61); Baoding, Hebei (drought in 
August 1960); Yiehang, Hubei (drought in July-August 1959); Beijing (heavy rainfall in 
July-August 1959); Nanning, Guanxi (heavy rainfall in June 1959, drought in June 
1960); Lanzhou, Gansu (heavy rainfall August 1959); Jinan, Shandong (a very dry 





In the spring of 1920, a severe drought gripped the lower part of 
the North China Plain, settling over northern Henan, western 
Shandong, and southern Hebei provinces.  This long drought 
extended into the spring of 1921.  As a result, several million 
farmers perished in what came to be called the North China 
Famine of 1921. 
 
No room for human agency there!  Dikötter’s stance is the polar 
opposite.  He repeatedly cites variants of Liu Shaoqi’s quip (picked up by Liu 
from peasants in his native Hunan) that the GLF famine was three parts natural 
and seven parts man-made (pp. 121, 178, 335), but only to reject Liu’s ‘three-
tenths Malthusian’ interpretation in favor of one that rests entirely on human 
agency.  
As Ireland and Ukraine attest, the temptation to turn famines into 
genocides is strong.  Dikötter, perhaps rightly sensing that this can distort 
reality, does not go quite as far as Chang and Halliday’s claim that Mao 
‘knowingly’ allowed millions to starve.  Indeed, one plausible reading of MGF’s 
narrative chapters is that it took a long time for the leadership in Beijing to 
grasp the scale of the catastrophe at its height.  Utopian euphoria and a 
revolutionary impatience to catch up quickly had prompted the Great Leap.  
They also neutered defence minister Peng Dehuai’s interventions at the Lushan 
'think-in' in July 1959.  Peng’s protests, in any case, were less about the famine 
per se than the follies of the Leap in its first phase.  Dikötter’s depiction of the 
follies is excellent, and corroborates the more theoretical case previously  
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advanced by economists and economic historians such as Yao (1999), Tao and 
Yang (2005), Bernstein (2006), and Wheatcroft (2010). 
How much did Beijing know when the famine was at its height?  Despite 
MGF’s relentless anti-Mao stance, it accepts that nobody at the top realized 
beforehand how murderous the economic war against the peasantry would be.  
Mao’s private physician, repeatedly invoked by Dikötter as a reliable witness 
(p. 346), ‘doubted that [Mao] really knew’ what was happening (Li 1994), and 
we are told that Mao was ‘visibly shaken’ when presented with graphic reports 
of famine from Xinyang in Henan province in late October 1960 (p. 116). 
Reliable information was at a premium; even the ‘fabled Sinologists’ in the 
British Embassy had no clue about what was going on (p. 345).  Blaming the 
tragedy on the usual counterrevolutionary suspects, Mao nonetheless had 
‘abusive cadres’ removed.  The news from Xinyang set in train moves that 
would mark ‘the beginning of the end of mass starvation’ (p. 118).  In that 
same month Mao, under pressure from critics of the Leap, ordered the 
redeployment of a million workers from industry to agriculture in Gansu 
province, citing the truism that ‘no one can do without grain’ (MacFarquhar 
1983: 323).  Various concessions to the peasantry followed, and in January 1961 
Mao told the 9
th central committee plenum ‘that socialist construction…should 
take half a century’ (Barnouin and Changgen 2007: 188).  For the millions who 
died in 1959 and 1960, it was already too late. 
China lacked an all-seeing, all-knowing Soviet-style secret police during 
the Leap.  Too much reliance was placed on poorly monitored regional agents  
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and thuggish local cadres.  Why else would it take a visit to his home village in 
Hunan for Liu Shaoqi to discover the dimensions of the disaster?  What he saw 
converted him overnight from supporter to ‘blistering’ critic of the GLF (pp. 
119-121).  Central planner-in-chief Li Fuchun’s reaction to the reports from 
Xinyang was that misguided policies (which he had championed) had cost lives 
(pp. 116-17, 122).  In a speech in Hunan to party planners in mid-1961 he 
summarized what have become textbook criticisms of central planning: ‘too 
high, too big, too equal, too dispersed, too chaotic, too fast, too inclined to 
transfer resources’ (p. 122).  But thanks to a form of ‘closed’ governance of 
their own creation, Mao and the party leadership seem to have discovered 
‘destruction on a scale few could have imagined’ rather late in the day (p. 
123). 
None of this absolves Mao from responsibility for the policies that caused 
the greatest famine ever.  But reckless miscalculation and culpable ignorance 
are not quite the same as deliberately or knowingly starving millions (Jin 2009: 
152).  Few of the myriad deaths in 1959-61 were sanctioned or ordained from 




MGF’s reliance on fresh archival sources and interviews and its extensive 
bibliography of Chinese-language items are impressive, but its bite-size 
chapters (thirty-seven in all) and breathless prose style—replete with 
                                                 
8 On the comparison with Soviet planning in the 1930s see Wheatcroft (2010).  
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expressions like ‘plummeted’, ‘rocketed’, ‘beaten to a pulp’, ‘beaten black 
and blue’, ‘frenzy’, ‘ceaseless’, ‘frenzied witch-hunt’—are often more 
reminiscent of the tabloid press than the standard academic monograph. If 
Yang Jisheng is destined to be China’s Alexander Solzhenitzyn, Frank Dikötter 
now replaces Jasper Becker as its Anne Appelbaum.  The success of MGF should 
not deter other historians from writing calmer and more nuanced books that 
worry more about getting the numbers right and pay due attention to 
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